Judicial Notice after Default: A Semantical Maze by Anderson, Guy William, Jr.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 7
1971
Judicial Notice after Default: A Semantical Maze
Guy William Anderson Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guy William Anderson Jr., Judicial Notice after Default: A Semantical Maze, 37 J. Air L. & Com. 109 (1971)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol37/iss1/7
Notes
Judicial Notice After Default: A Semantical Maze
In the complexities of civil procedure seemingly related judicial doc-
trines, highly effective when independently applied, often become
stumbling blocks to efficient judicial administration when combined.
Of the various doctrines, none better demonstrate an unusual combina-
tion than the doctrines of judicial notice and default judgment. Both
doctrines are designed to expedite litigation, but if applied together
in a certain manner can result in delay and more extensive, wasteful liti-
gation of the facts. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes' is illustrative.
In Hughes TWA filed a petition under the Clayton Act asking dam-
ages from Howard R. Hughes, Hughes Tool Co., and Raymond M.
Holliday, alleging an attempt to monopolize interstate and foreign
commerce in the supplying of aircraft. Howard Hughes failed to appear
for the taking of depositions and the court therefore granted TWA's
application for default judgment.' The district court appointed a special
master to determine damages and entered rulings concerning the effect
of the defendant's default on the assessment of damages." The special
master submitted his report awarding damages of over $136,000,000,
after trebling under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Both parties objected
to the acceptance of the report. The defendant contended that allega-
tions made in the complaint were contrary to facts of which the court
should take judicial notice. More specifically, it was contended that
material contained in the files of the Civil Aeronautics Board showed
that Hughes Tool Company never manufactured or engaged in the sale
and lease of aircraft as alleged by the plaintiff. The court held that a
default judgment precludes the court from taking judicial notice of
facts that are not indisputably true; material in CAB files, being merely
evidentiary and rebuttable, cannot be considered indisputable An
analysis of the problem resolved by the court in Hughes highlights the
need for an approach to both the doctrine of default judgment and
judicial notice that concentrates on the purposes of the doctrine rather
than the mechanical application of a rule.
1308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
215 U.S.C. §§ 1-33 (1964).
' Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 32 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 38 F.R.D. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).0 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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I. THE EFFECT OF THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for a default judgment to
be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend.! Fail-
ure to obey an order to give deposition is specifically made a ground for
the entry of a default judgment.' The effect of default under modern
practice has been similar to the effect prior to the adoption of the rules;'
well pleaded allegations of material facts that are necessary to be proved
in order to support a recovery are taken to be confessed by a default.
The defendant is therefore estopped to deny such allegations." The
essence of this estoppel is that there has been a judicial determination of
a fact, not that this determination is based on the defendant's failure
to plead. When the well pleaded complaint alleges the defendant's
liability and the defendant defaults, the liability is established. It is only
necessary for the court to establish the damages arising from the ad-
mitted liability. The complaint in Hughes was tested by the defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." The court denied the mo-
tion but certified an interlocutory appeal." The court of appeals affirm-
ed the ruling as to the sufficiency of the complaint 3 and the Supreme
Court dismissed writs of certiorari as improvidently granted. 4 Thus,
the complaint was well pleaded and was sufficient to support the default
judgment.
The judgment by default is just as conclusive an adjudication be-
tween the parties of whatever is essential to support the judgment as one
rendered after answer and contest. 5 The fact that the default is con-
clusive only to well pleaded allegations constitutes a significant excep-
tion to the conclusiveness of a default judgment. Allegations will not
stand as admitted if they are "indefinite or vague,"" or not susceptible
7FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
I FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
'The modern effect of a default judgment finds its foundation in the English courts
of chancery and in a bill taken pro con!esso. Lord Hardwick likened a bill taken pro
con!esso to a judgment nihil dici at common law and a judgment for plaintiff on de-
murrer to the defendant's plea. A bill was taken pro confesso when the defendant failed
to answer and the effect was that the well pleaded allegations of the bill were taken
as admitted or confessed because of the defendant's failure to plead. Tompson v.
Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885).
"Harsham v. Knox County, 122 U.S. 306 (1887); Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tuler
Min. Co., 157 U.S. 683 (1895).
'1 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) states in part: "... (1) lack of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter .... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,..."
"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 204 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964).
'"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 380 U.S. 248 (1965).
15 Harshman v. Knox County, 122 U.S. 306 (1887); Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tuler
Min. Co., 157 U.S. 683 (1895).
'
0 Tompson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885).
to proof by legitimate evidence,'7 or when they are contrary to uncon-
troverted material in the file of the case,"8 or when they are contrary to
facts of which the court will take judicial notice." The final category
represents the predominate issue in Hughes.
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice has generally been defined as a court's acknowledg-
ment of the truth of a matter without formal evidence;" it has been
pointed out that "notice" implies a chargeability with knowledge." In
1222 Brackton mentioned a similar concept in the marginal notes of
one of his works,' while Bentham in his work on evidence described a
procedure where either party might ask the judge to assume a fact as
proven when the fact is notoriously true." Both of these references
allude, if not by name then by purpose, to the concept of judicial
notice, that purpose being to liberate the court from the costly and time-
consuming formalities of proof under the rules of evidence in those in-
stances when dispute is unlikely.' The application of the doctrine of
judicial notice in modem practice represents a varied attempt by the
courts to fulfill the purpose of the doctrine.
Generally, judicial notice is taken of matters of law and matters of
fact in two situations, when the parties have waived dispute and when
the court is justified in declaring the truth of a matter without requiring
evidence." The latter situation represents the more controversial area
because the contested interests of the litigants are determined.
A court will take judicial notice of various matters of law, and will
not be limited to formal evidence in these determinations." Generally,
courts will notice the common law, constitutions, public statutes in
"'Cohen v. United States, 129 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1942); Greeson v. Imperial Irr.
Dist., 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932).
"Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. Southern Calif. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1953);
In re Woodmar Realty Co., 294 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803
(1962).
"Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1934).
"1 "That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without
the offering of evidence." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2567(a) (3d ed. 1940).
2 THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 278 n. 1
(1898); Comment, Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L. REV.
528 (1968), citing Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 11 (1922).
"1 McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Con-
troversy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 779, 783 (1961), citing 2 BRACTON's N.B., case 194 (1222)
(marginal notation).
"J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 256-57 (1887); T. STARKIE, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 400 (2d ed. 1828). Starkie first used the
phrase "judicial notice" in reference to Bentham's views.
24McNAUGHTON, supra note 22, at 783.
25WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2565.
"1 MCNAUGHTON, supra note 22, 787.
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force in all jurisdictions, as well as acts and rulings of various other
governmental bodies that have the force and effect of law." Although
such matters may be labeled legislative facts, they are used exclusively
by the judge in developing law and policy."8
Adjudicative facts are facts about the particular parties to the con-
troversy, their activities, their property, and their interests." In addition,
facts that answer who did what, where, when, why and how are all
adjudicative."0 However, considerable controversy exists about just what
type of facts may be judicially noticed. Professor McNaughton, in de-
scribing this controversy, states:
Their [Wigmore and Thayer as opposed to Morgan] difference relates
to judicial notice of facts. It is express in Thayer and implicit in Wigmore
that (perhaps because the matter is rebuttable) judicial notice may be
applied not only to indisputable matters but also to matters of lesser cer-
tainty. Morgan on the other hand defines judicial notice more narrowly,
and his consequences follow from his definition. He limits judicial notice
of fact to matters patently indisputable.31
The controversy does not end in a determination of which facts may
be judicially noticed, but involves the conclusiveness of a fact once
it has been noticed. Wigmore, following Thayer, takes the position that
the judicially noticed fact is not conclusive but remains rebuttable.
Morgan, on the other hand, asserts that once a fact is judicially noticed,
it is conclusively determined."
The areas of application of the doctrine of judicial notice are as
broad as the judicial function. A court may take judicial notice of
either fact or law at any stage during the litigation.3" An appellate court
may also apply the doctrine on appeal." In taking judicial notice of
law or facts in various stages of litigation, the courts are faced with
27 See, e.g., UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 9 which provides in part:
(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the
common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state,
territory and jurisdiction of the United States,...
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a) private
acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the
legislature of this state and duly enacted ordinances and duly pub-
lished regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of this
state and (b) the law of foreign countries....
SMcCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REV. 305 (1952).
"Id.
20 Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
21 McNAUGHTON, supra note 22 at 779.
2Compare, WIGMORE, supra note 20, 5 2567; with Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm'n,
301 U.S. 300 (1937); and Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REV. 269, 273-74, 279,
285 (1944).




different procedural problems; they sometimes utilize the doctrine of
judicial notice in the manner most fitting to the particular stage of
litigation when a question arises. Under this "functional approach," the
Wigmorian theory might be applied at trial while the more stringent
requirements of the Morgan theory would be utilized after the entry
of judgment. Thus, for example, under the functional approach the
scope of judicial notice of facts should be limited by the function that
the judge is performing when the notice is taken." Whatever approach
is utilized, clearly the doctrine of judicial notice represents no explic-
able doctrine, but rather a combination of concepts with various appli-
cations that aid in the accomplishment of expeditious litigation, the
purpose of the doctrine.
III. JUDICIAL NOTICE AFTER DEFAULT
The application of the doctrine of judicial notice to facts that dispute
allegations made in the complaint after default raises several questions. It
appears certain that a court may take notice of such facts," but to what
extent is uncertain. In Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co." the Fourth
Circuit took judicial notice of a "mathematically obvious"" fact to
show certain acts were private rather than public after a default judg-
ment. This decision, however, leaves unanswered an important ques-
tion: if a court takes judicial notice after default, do the facts have to
be indisputable or merely presumptive thus allowing the opposing party
to litigate their validity?" If rebuttable, the defaulting party would be
allowed to litigate issues that stand admitted."0 Notice of facts after
judgment presented a perplexing problem in judicial procedure un-
decided until Hughes.
In accepting the special master's report, the court in Hughes ruled
that it would not take notice of CAB material, indicating that Hughes
Tool Co. had never been involved in the sale or lease of aircraft since
this material was not indisputable. The court indicated that nothing less
than indisputable facts would justify the taking of judicial notice of
facts relating to liability after the entry of default. Thus, within the
limited context of default judgment, the court adopted the Morgan
approach to judicial notice.4' Had the court applied the Wigmorian
theory, creating a rebuttable presumption of the validity of the ju-
"See, e.g., Comment, Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L.
REv. 528 (1968).
" 72 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1934).
7 Id.
'
8 Id. at 889.
'9 McNAUGHTON, supra note 22.
4 Tompson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885).
4 t See note 32 supra and accompaning text.
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dicially noticed facts, a preliminary hearing would have been essential
to afford the plaintiff a chance to rebut the noticed material, thus
actually allowing the defendant to litigate issues foreclosed by default.
However, the court specifically limited its decision to apply only to
situations involving default judgment. Judge Metzner acknowledged
the controversy" existing as to whether judicial notice at trial may be
taken of facts that are not indisputable, but he declined to decide this
controversy, preferring instead to limit the application of his decision
to situations when the defendant has defaulted. The decision indirectly
recognized that a different approach to the subject of judicial notice is
necessary at the various stages of litigation. This recognition is signifi-
cant.
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
Most authorities agree that courts may take judicial notice of various
materials of administrative bodies.' The increasing number and im-
portance of administrative regulations in recent years has accentuated
the problem of their evidentiary treatment by the courts."
The discussion of administrative agency materials makes necessary
the distinction between matters of fact and matters of law. When the
matter to which the court is asked to take notice is a formal regulation,
it can be argued that judicial notice must be taken since regulations
have the force and effect of law, although it is generally considered to
be discretionary with the court.' If a fact stated in the pleadings is con-
tradicted by a regulation, the court should not blind itself to the truth
by refusing to take notice." When, however, the matter involves only
information gathered by the administrative agency, and that informa-
tion merely contradicts a fact, there is little argument that the judicial
notice does not rest in the sound discretion of the court.
In Stasiukevich v. Nicholls" the Second Circuit, in discussing the
stature of information promulgated by administrative agencies, stated:
But though the court may receive the report in evidence, or may takejudicial notice of its existence and contents, this does not mean that the
court must accept the findings in the report as indisputable truth; the
findings are merely evidence of the facts asserted. The credibility of such
"McNAUGHTON, supra note 22.
"See, e.g., UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 9, supra note 27.
'Note, Judicial Notice of Administrative Regulations, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1946).
4Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. v. Davis, 273 S.W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
"Southern Pac. R.R. v. Groeck, 68 Fed. 609 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1895); Livermore v.
Beale, 18 Cal. App.2d 535, 64 P.2d 987, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 712 (1937).
41 168 F.2d 416 (2nd. Cir. 1945), in reference to "judicial notice" taken of reports
of Truman Committee; "Even though we took 'notice' of these, the report would not
be conclusive, or more than evidence."
NOTES
evidence will vary according to the thoroughness and impartiality with
which the committee conducted its investigation, the fairness of its pro-
cedure, the fullness of opportunity it afforded accused individuals or
organizations to develop their side of the story; and, of course, the other
party may introduce evidence tending to prove the contrary of the facts
accepted in the official report. '
This language demonstrates not only that the judicial notice of the
factual administrative material rests in the discretion of the court but
also establishes criteria for evaluating whether the court should take
notice of factual material. In Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., ' a case
involving the judicial notice of tariffs filed with the CAB, the court
stated that judicial notice of the tariffs rests within the discretion of
the court, if such facts should be noticed at all. A distinction based
on the relative importance of the regulating body is often made; thus
regulation of major federal and state administrative agencies usually
have been noticed."0 Cases making the distinctions, however, have gen-
erally involved regulations taking the form of law rather than factual
materials when the criteria of Stasiukevich are more appropriate.
From the foregoing discussion, several generalizations can be drawn.
First, a court, when asked to take notice of a regulation of an administra-
tive agency that either interprets a formal statute or dispenses formal
regulations, encounters a strong influence to exercise its discretion and
notice the regulation. Second, when the material has been merely gather-
ed by, and its validity judged for purposes of, the administrative agency,
a court usually will notice it, depending upon the nature of the dispute"'
and the court's judgment concerning the agency's impartiality and
thoroughness."
The court in Hughes, determining that administrative material was
not indisputable and therefore should not be noticed, indicated that it
had considered the "nature of the subject matter" and the "apparent
justice of the case" and concluded that each of several factors counted
against the notice of the administrative material. The first of these factors
was that the proposition offered by the defendants was neither scientific,
historical, geographic nor statistical-the kind courts are willing to
notice; rather it was of a "garden variety," concerning who did what,
when and where. The second factor considered was that the CAB ma-
terial was controlling in an anti-trust suit. The more critical an issue is
to a case the more reluctant a court is to notice it. Finally, when the
48 Id.
49 8 F.R.D. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"
0 Boone v. State, 109 Ohio St. 1, 141 N.E. 841 (1923); WIGMORE, supra note 20,§ 2573. See Note, 29 HARV. L. REv. 786 (1916).
"MCNAUGHTON, supra note 22, at 779.
'Stasiukevich v. Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1948).
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defendant's default had resulted from his willful failure to appear, all
doubts should be resolved against him. The court noted that CAB ma-
terial might be noticed if the material is indisputable, but when it is
merely evidence and rebuttable, it can hardly be considered indispu-
table."
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial notice of facts that dispute allegations of the complaint after
default represents a unique situation; however, this situation points out
the acute problems judicial notice presents at this stage of litigation.
Judicial notice after default, in effect, shows admitted facts to be un-
tenable. While the effect seems to present an insurmountable semantical
problem, Hughes presents the solution, i.e. a balancing of the interests
involved. The judicial notice of indisputable facts after default prevents
an obvious injustice resulting from the default, without allowing the
defaulting party to escape all the results of the actions that resulted in
the entry of judgment. Notice under these circumstances does not allow
the defendant to litigate all the issues of the complaint that he might
show to be invalid, as would be the case it the presumptive theory were
utilized; rather it takes into account the defendant's opportunity to liti-
gate any and all issues prior to his actions resulting in default. The
court's decision in Hughes further recognizes the purpose of judicial
notice, to expedite litigation, and does not allow the doctrine to be
applied in this situation to make the litigation more exhaustive and
complicated.
Hughes demonstrates the advantages of using a functional approach
of judicial notice. Under this approach notice would be limited in terms
of the function that the judge is performing when asked to take judicial
notice. This application of the doctrine results in the useful and workable
procedure in expediting litigation by allowing an immediate judicial
determination of various issues when such determination would not
prejudice any of the rights of the parties.
Guy William Anderson, Jr.
" Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
